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1. Introduction and Empirical Facts 
The primary motivation for analysing the informal sector as an important 
economic activity comes from the fact that on an average 70 per cent of the labour 
force in the developing countries work under arrangements outside the purview of 
what is typically known as the formal/organised sector.  Data published by the ILO 
reports varying rates of labour force participation in Southeast Asian, East European, 
African, and Latin American countries.  Ranging from 15 per cent to 20 per cent in 
Turkey and Slovakia to 80 per cent in Zambia, or about 83 per cent in Myanmar imply 
large share of the active labour force as engaged in informal activities.  Moreover, 
considering the state of agricultural and rural activities in these countries, it is quite 
apparent that the total shares of the informal sector in these countries are even higher.  
This is corroborated by some of the other studies, which provide evidence that in low-
income countries like Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, India, and elsewhere, the 
share of the urban informal sector is at least as high as 51 per cent.  Alternatively, 
seen from the point of view of the „minimum wage‟ earners, only 11 per cent of 
Tunisia‟s labour force, for example, is subject to minimum wage; in Mexico and 
Morocco, a substantive number earns less than the minimum wage; in Taiwan, the 
minimum wage received by many is less than half of the average wage, and etc. 
(Agenor, 1996). 
  Understandably, these are approximations based on sample studies because 
the typical gamut of informality in developing countries precludes exact estimates of 
turnovers and employment in such occupations.  The importance of informal sector in 
the livelihood of a large number of workers in poor countries is further emphasised in 
view of only 1 to 5 per cent activity in less populous developed countries.  For India, 
fortunately, a considerably reliable survey of informal units is available from the 
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National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO).  It consists of samples of informal 
units drawn from almost all the provinces and union territories and usually published 
every five years.  The survey covers the average yearly wage, employment, major 
occupational categories by broad industry types, gender, fixed assets and value added 
of the informal units classified as Non-Directory Manufacturing Enterprises (NDMEs) 
and Own Account Enterprises (OAEs), both rural and urban in either case.  The 
sample size varies from less than 100 units in relatively remote locations to more than 
10,000 for major states.   
The research issues one could cover and estimate empirically requires 
manoeuvring within the available data and might turn out to be restrictive for very 
general questions.  Nevertheless, there are some issues which this data set still 
supports in favour of improving our understanding of the connection between 
theoretical and empirical idiosyncrasies of this sector.  To this end, Kar and Marjit 
(2009) and Marjit and Kar (2007) takes up the urban NDMEs given their strong inter-
linkage with the urban formal sector for five consecutive rounds of the NSSO data: 
1984-85, 1989-90, 1994-95, 1999-2000 and 2000-01, for 17 states in the first period 
and that extended to all the states and union territories for the remaining time period.  
These papers show that the period of gradual trade liberalisation in India, i.e. the post-
1991 decade which led to closures of many formal and traditional industries releasing 
unskilled labour in large numbers coincides significantly with annual (real) growths in 
(i) urban informal wage (IW), (ii) urban informal fixed assets (as a proxy for capital 
formation, FA) and (iii) urban informal value added (VA).  The latter two variables are 
used to explain the movement of the first.   
The reason behind choosing these variables is strongly embedded in the 
theoretical structures these papers construct.  We believe that the co-existence and 
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close interaction between formal and informal sector in India and in similar countries 
is an appropriate representation of both production organisation and the labour market.  
While a number of studies take up this mode and discuss many related questions, the 
basic idea spawns from a relative movement of capital and labour between these 
sectors and how that affects the factor prices in general equilibrium (Marjit, 2003).  
This, we have explored in other occasions (Marjit and Kar, 2010; Marjit and Kar, 
2007, for example) to reemphasise the fact that the general equilibrium implications 
of inter-sector mobility of factors of production quite suitably explain the dynamics of 
the informal sector as corroborated by empirical findings.   These studies have used 
external shocks as dictating the initial readjustments in the economy with a relatively 
advanced formal sector and a technologically primitive informal sector.  The more 
precise issue originates from the empirical observation that trade liberalisation drives 
capital and labour into the informal sector and yet the wage rises across states, steeply 
for some and moderately for the rest, leading to an average annual real wage growth 
of 10% somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom.  Similar studies for Brazil and 
Colombia (see Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003) provide no conclusive evidence.  
Evidence drown from various issues of  the International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
shows that though tariffs have come down both in Brazil and Colombia, the decline in 
the interest rate is distinctly visible for Brazil.  It may be the case that for Brazil the 
interplay of offsetting effects is responsible for little or no change in the size of the 
informal sector, while for Colombia the tariff effect has been predominant in ushering 
an expansion of informality within its firm structures.1     
Concerning the broader question on what drives informalisation among firms, 
few recent papers like McKenzie and Sakho (2010), Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), 
                                                 
1
 Also see Kelley (1994) for Peru, Gindling (1991) for Cost Rica, Berry (1998) for Latin America in 
general,  
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Fugazza and Jacques (2003), etc. discuss possible channels.  Of these, Dabla-Norris et 
al. (2008) finds that the quality of the legal framework is crucial for determining the 
size of the informal sector for eighty developing and developed countries.  If the legal 
system is functional on the other hand, then the significance of taxes, regulations and 
constraints are of limited importance.  Not surprisingly, they also find that the firm 
size and the degree of informality are negatively correlated, although stringent legal 
norms and not credit constraint so much, may still push larger firms to function in the 
informal segment.  McKenzie and Sakho (2009) on the other hand, argue that tax 
registration for firms in Bolivia, where the incidence of informality is the largest in 
South America, tax registration leads to lower profits among smaller and larger firms, 
while it increase profits for mid-sized firms.  They show that very small firms deemed 
as own account enterprises have little to gain from formalisation.  Conversely, the 
firms which can grow up to the extent of hiring six workers, too have little to gain 
from formalization as they end up paying more taxes without the added benefit of 
tapping the extra clientele that they already are catering to.  The ones in the middle, 
stands as the only group which thrive on aspirations of growing bigger and often 
realises such profits that come from the ability to show tax receipts as an instrument 
engendering reputation and consequently consumer confidence.  We discuss more on 
the political economy of the emergence of informal sector in section 2.     
Furthermore, Straub (2005) argues that compliance with formal registration 
procedures at a cost allows firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of 
property rights and contracts.  This would ultimately enable the firms to participate in 
the formal credit market as well.  The access to formal credit market, according to this 
paper is evaluated against the relative costs of existence in either of these regimes and 
should be considered as a critical determinant of the choice between formality and 
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informality.  The relationship between economic reforms and informalisation also 
vary widely for African countries (see, for example, Savard and Adjovi, 1997 for 
Benin; Sethuraman, 1997; Bautista, Lofgren and Thomas, 1998 for Zimbabwe; Xaba 
et al 2002, for a number of counties showing steady growth in informal output and 
employment; Verick, 2006 for an overall account, etc.).  Finally, note that the health 
of the informal sector is deeply related to the extent of poverty in these countries and 
many of these studies also discuss the connection (see, Kar and Marjit, 2009 for a 
general discussion and estimates for India).           
Are relationships then country-specific and nothing could be offered at a more 
universal level to account for similar patterns for a large number of developing and 
transition countries? The theory and supporting evidence we present is an effort to 
find a more uniform relationship in general equilibrium structures.  Section 2 
discusses the political economy views on the emergence of informal sectors in 
developing countries.  Section 3 offers empirical findings on India and section 4 
develops the theory.  Section 5 discusses the implications of change in informal wages 
on aggregate poverty situation and section 6 discusses the close linkage between 
informality and corruption.  Section 7 concludes.  Algebraic derivations and related 
tables are available in the appendix.          
 
2. Emergence of the Informal Sector 
Before we land into the analytical domain of models dealing with informal 
labour, we must offer a discussion on why and how the informal sector has emerged 
and whether it is a deterrent to the process of development.  Is it partly a conscious 
choice of the state or is it something that is imposed on the state?  The borderline 
between legal and extra legal can be an endogenous political choice in a democracy, a 
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thesis which has again been somewhat neglected in discussions on politics and 
economics of development.  
A couple of texts that set the stage for such discussions are by Hernando De 
Soto (2000) and Avinash Dixit (2004), albeit they are written from two different 
perspectives.  De Soto‟s book “The Mystery of Capital” brings to the forefront the 
lack of property rights and legal contracts in the informal segment that locks in huge 
amount of capital, blocking development all around. The policy of guaranteeing 
property rights, enforcement of legal contracts etc., is expected to release capital for 
investment and growth.  Dixit on the other hand talks about lawlessness of economics 
that necessitates appropriately designed contracts needed for conducting business. 
Dixit‟s book is oriented mainly to a varied treatment of the intricacies of contractual 
arrangements reflecting on the boundaries between legality and extra-legality that are 
often rather thin.  De Soto‟s contribution, on the other hand, draws on some casual 
empirical work and offers a range of persuasive anecdotes.  Nevertheless, both in a 
sense admit the problems and complications arising from inclusion of the concept of 
informality in economic activities, and consequently in economic analyses.  De Soto‟s 
position seems, however, in favour of legalising the extra-legal, while Dixit provides a 
workable structure within the domain of the extra-legal.  Both of these approaches 
indirectly hold the state and the regulatory structures responsible for the emergence of 
informal arrangements and formalising the informal seems to be the first best choice 
that is somehow not implemented by the state. 
Contrary to these, two recent studies by Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) 
and Dasgupta and Marjit (2006) provide political rational on the part of the state to 
perpetuate informal arrangements.  We use the first of these to develop a model in 
section 2.2, while the essential arguments in Marjit, Ghosh and Biswas (2007) shall 
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complement the analysis from the corruption and reform issues that also significantly 
affect the existence and functioning of the informal sector.  Furthermore, the paper by 
Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) argues that given high incidence of poverty and 
absence of a social welfare system, a democratic state uses the informal sector as a 
buffer for the poor people.  The extra legal occupations work as substitutes for social 
security and emerge as an innovative and effective re-distributive strategy.   
The degree of enforcement of property rights by itself becomes a strategic 
political variable at this juncture.  Typically, in median voter models, tax is the only 
instrument for redistributing income from the rich to the poor.  However, there can be 
alternative instruments as well, somewhat underexplored in the related domain.  In the 
developing world, the majority of the workforce is employed in the informal sector, in 
activities that are illegal or extralegal.  Studies by Marcouiller and Young (1995), 
Choi and Thum (2004) and Marjit (2003) deal with the cases where government 
policies determine and interact with the size of the informal or shadow activities.  
Allowing extra legal activities to flourish, which amounts to a thriving informal sector 
may be a conscious strategy on the part of the government in a poor country, since it 
helps tackling the problem of unemployment and poverty.  Sarcastically, one might 
coin it as the policy of  „development through backdoor‟ which often delivers the 
desired goals set by the government in power, essentially being in power for a long 
patch of time, particularly when frontal development initiatives turns out to be 
difficult owing to levels of vested interest within the government.  Doubtless, such 
strategic negligence on the part of the government may be harmful for the 
environment fostering legitimate income generating processes.  For example, allowing 
street vendors to congest the streets, ignoring illegal electric connections, allowing 
people to sleep on the pavements or on the railway platforms, allowing slums to 
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develop in public spaces, all of these may reflect tolerance by the government and the 
civil society alike, not necessarily on humanitarian pretexts. 
For developing countries, it seems, that the jury is still out on whether the state 
as an authority can set limits to use of public space for private consumption, albeit 
there are well defined rules one way or the other.  In fact, this debate lies at the core of 
the larger choice between formality and informality, which requires further 
understanding in similar contexts.  In recent times a few papers, such as that by 
McKenzie and Sakho (2010), Dabla-Norris et al. (2008), Fugazza and Jacques (2003), 
and etc., however, discuss the channels leading to informality among firms.  Of these, 
the first study finds that the quality of the legal framework is crucial for determining 
the size of the informal sector.  If the legal system is functional on the other hand, 
then the significance of taxes, regulations and constraints are of limited importance.  
Not surprisingly, they also find that the firm size and the degree of informality are 
negatively correlated, although stringent legal norms and not credit constraint so 
much, may still push larger firms to function in the informal segment.  McKenzie and 
Sakho (2009) on the other hand, argue that tax registration for firms in Bolivia, where 
the incidence of informality is the largest in South America, tax registration leads to 
lower profits among smaller and larger firms, while it increase profits for mid-sized 
firms.  They show that very small firms deemed as own account enterprises have little 
to gain from formalisation.  Conversely, the firms which can grow up to the extent of 
hiring six workers, too have little to gain from formalization as they end up paying 
more taxes without the added benefit of tapping the extra clientele that they already 
are catering to.  The ones in the middle, stands as the only group which thrive on 
aspirations of growing bigger and often realises such profits that come from the ability 
to show tax receipts as an instrument engendering reputation and consequently 
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consumer confidence.  Furthermore, Straub (2005) argues that compliance with 
formal registration procedures at a cost allows firms to benefit from key public goods, 
enforcement of property rights and contracts.  This would ultimately enable the firms 
to participate in the formal credit market as well.  The access to formal credit market, 
according to this paper is evaluated against the relative costs of existence in either of 
these regimes and should be considered as a critical determinant of the choice 
between formality and informality.   
From a public economics point of view, it is possible that the imposition of a 
suitable tax burden by the social planner on the formal sector towards formalising the 
informal may turn out to be self-defeating in purpose.  The tax burden meant for re-
distribution and rehabilitation may be so high that those in the formal sector gets 
dissuaded from working within the formal sector and choose to become net recipients 
by switching sides drying up the tax base in the process.  Thus, the problem is not one 
which lends itself to unmixed solutions.  At the same time, it can hardly be denied that 
some of these extra-legal activities may actually hurt the legal income earners by 
creating negative externalities both in the production process as well as in public life.  
In this context, once again a few recent attempts deal with the determinants of 
informality, such as, that by Chong and Gradstein (2007) which proposes a simple 
theoretical model where the extent of informality is positively related to income 
inequality present in the country and is positively sensitive to presence of weak 
institutions.  The surprise element is however, that the size of the informal sector is 
negatively related to the economy's wealth.  To this end, the study shows that the 
choice of producing in the formal sector vis-à-vis the informal sector is based on the 
equality of expected utilities from the two decisions and the equality generates a cut-
off income level below which all are poor and produce in the informal sector.  As the 
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country becomes richer, this cut-off point is pushed up leading to larger informal units 
in equilibrium. This result must appear counterintuitive and could lend itself to 
analytical reasons and empirical evidence for a large number of countries – developed 
and developing – only under the argument that the positive growth effect is countered 
by the negative effect on size of informal sectors due to tightened institutional quality 
that follows economic development.  Nevertheless, the study further establishes that 
both the proxies for the tax burden and the labour rigidity turn out to be not robust at 
all and mostly not significant except for a limited number of specifications.   
    On the basis of the above arguments, we discuss two instruments in the 
hands of the government for redistribution – tax and governance.  A relatively weak 
governance structure allows for extensive informality, which helps the poor, but hurts 
people with tax paying capacity, whereas strong governance protects the legal 
taxpayer, but increases the possibility of social unrest as the incidence of poverty and 
inequality increases.  The cost of sustaining governance is financed by income tax.  
All the societies considered in various models, with different poverty levels and 
different extents of income inequality, face identical political support functions, and 
we do not consider totalitarian regimes.  In most cases, as in this model we shall 
briefly discuss, the political regime consists of a two party democracy.  It is well 
known in the political economy context that, policies targeted at satisfying the 
preference of the median voter help win the election.  With the aid of a simplistic 
model we show that there is a reasonable case for strong governance and high tax for 
those societies that experience lower incidence of poverty and a lower income 
inequality.  Conversely, in societies where the incidences of poverty and income 
inequality are high, the level of governance is chosen to be weak, as well as the 
income tax rate, lower.  If the government perceives that the effect of the tightness 
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and rigidity in the level of governance on the informal income is not very strong, then 
also it might choose relatively higher level of tax rate and regulatory controls.  In this 
regard, we follow the standard „political support‟ approach developed by Stigler 
(1971) and Peltzman (1976).  Interested readers may also refer to Persson and 
Tabellini (2000), Hillman (2003) etc. for a textual treatment of issues related to the 
median voter approach. 
The existence of an unorganised sector helps the organised firms to take 
advantage of liberal economic policies and in a way use a disadvantage to gain 
competitive advantages, locally and globally.  This is adequately demonstrated in 
Marjit and Maiti (2007) and Maiti and Marjit (2008).  Dasgupta and Marjit (2006) use 
a framework with unionised labour and informal workers and show that the state will 
have reasons to undermine the strength of trade unions and stealthily promote the 
culture of informal sector, again to push forward liberal policies.   
Essentially, therefore, these papers look at the possible reasons as to why the 
state may be reluctant in clearly defining the boundaries of legal institutions and 
consequently chose an optimal degree of enforcement.  In a related paper Sarkar 
(2006) writes on the economic policies of the left-ruled state government in the state 
of West Bengal in India and argues that the ruling coalition has encouraged 
proliferation of the informal sector as if on a clientele mode, such that they are always 
in a position to control the economic lives of the poor.  This is also in line with the 
general tenet of the argument that the informal sector becomes a necessary element of 
state sponsored political strategy, especially when the institutions themselves are 
endogenously designed and their limits are manipulated to obtain highest political 
returns.  It may perhaps be best viewed as the well-known dilemma of rules versus 
discretion as exemplified in the macroeconomic theory in a different context (Barro 
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and Gordon, 1983).  Institutional commitment specifies certain rules of the game 
relatively sticky and unmanipulable.  On the other hand the state sometimes needs 
flexibility to foster adopted policies and at times to steer political self-interest.  
Informal sector provides a great opportunity to practice discretion.  Great many 
concerns behind formalising the informal often miss out this simple motivation 
prevalent in a democracy.  Marcoullier and Young (1995) is an elegant piece related 
to the political issues discussed above.  It talks about the predatory state that uses 
informal arrangements to extract revenues.  
We devote our attention to this issue in tune with one of the purposes of the 
book, i.e., dwelling on a number of serious contemporary concerns regarding the 
organisation of production in the informal sector for the developing countries in 
general and for India in particular.  One could extend the line of argument developed 
by Sarkar (2006) and Marjit, Mukherjee and Kolmar (2006) and analyze how state 
actually renders a fairly organised form of political supervision and control of the 
unorganised sector in India.  In fact, there seems to be a tremendous “organised” 
intervention if one takes the case of left ruled West Bengal.  The parallel informal 
economy employs people, leads to politically recognised and guarded activities, and 
generates revenues that are redistributed to strengthen political patronage.  If markets 
and policies promote relatively unfettered growth of small private investments, poor 
people‟s dependence on politics and politicians will be far less and that undoubtedly 
poses a threat to the political power structure.  Unlike in the developed countries 
politicians in India hardly have alternative occupations.  Fully functional market 
capitalism, if it delivers, shall go against such entrenched vested interest.  Yet, 
politicians need markets, to the extent it absorbs the poor, and helps them to have an 
economically meaningful existence.  The fear of social unrest and worse, civil war, or 
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revolution powerful enough to shatter the very foundation of political power in a 
democracy seems to have driven important considerations behind visibly large 
patronage of the informal sector acting as a pure substitute for the front-door 
development efforts on the part of the governments.  It is this kind of trade-off that 
makes the informal sector a strategic conduit of development. This issue, to our 
understanding remains a wide and open research question. 
Another important departure from the existing literature is the issue of 
governance.  This relates our paper to the economics of corruption and its impact on 
the informal sector.  Interested readers may look at Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997), 
Kolmar and Marjit (2000), Dessey and Pallage (2003) and Choi and Thum (2004) 
among others.  Use of informal workers is illegal in our set-up since this involves 
violation of labour laws. We argue that if the producer is monitored and apprehended 
for operating an „informal‟ segment, he faces a penalty such as losing the license to 
produce the import competing product, thereby losing the tariff protection. However, 
he can escape by paying a bribe to the apprehending agent. It is reasonable to argue 
that the opportunity costs of such actions are increasing in benefits from protection.  
We develop an explicit Nash-bargaining structure to determine the equilibrium bribe.  
This outcome is internalised by the firm while deciding on the allocation of 
production and employment choice between the formal and the informal sectors. Our 
focus is on reforms related to the external sector involving a decline in the tariff rate 
and deregulation of capital account, thereby causing cost of capital (or the borrowing 
cost) to fall.  This has been a worldwide phenomenon for sometime now and real 
interest rates have drastically come down, especially in the developing world.  For 
example, in India, one of the redeeming consequences of reforms has been a 
phenomenal increase in foreign exchange reserve and a sharp decline in the interest 
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rates. 
 
3. Reform and Informal Wage in India          
Therefore, what could possibly explain the post reform average rise in the 
informal wage across India, between 1991 and 2001?  Notably, this is also the period 
when trade liberalisation started affecting the formal industrial sectors through 
withdrawal of protection and decrease in import barriers.  The retrenchment of 
workers and thwarted job creations under the circumstances are both expected to put 
pressure on non-formal job markets.  The basis tenet goes that if unskilled labour 
formerly part of the organized sector flows into the informal counterpart due to 
retrenchment, or most fresh job-seeker looks up to the informal sector then the 
informal wage must fall to accommodate them.  The informal sector is characterised 
by the fact that wages are determined in a competitive setting and not administered by 
prior negotiations with labour unions.  Therefore, in the aftermath of trade 
liberalisation one expects the informal wage to fall in equilibrium and worsen the 
conditions of the working poor.  On the contrary, the informal wage actually grew in 
real terms.  We figured from the available data that the annual growth in real wages 
(deflated by 1989-90 consumer price index of India) in the NDMEs have a key 
relationship with the annual growth in real Fixed Assets (FA, and stands for capital 
accumulation) and the real Value Added (VA) within the informal units.  A rise in FA, 
an equivalent to capital formation, is expected to affect the informal wage positively 
as would a rise in the value added.  Simple regression analyses over yearly cross 
sections for each round of data and subsequently over pooled data for all the available 
years run as a pseudo-panel confirm positive relationships that are statistically 
significant.  This implies that higher capitalisation and higher value addition in the 
 16 
informal sector have outweighed the downward pressure on real wage due to large 
labour influx.  The increased capitalisation is possible when capital from the formal 
sector relocates to the informal sector and when fresh investments take place in the 
latter.  It has been previously shown (Marjit and Kar, 2007) that the rise in capital 
deployment in the informal sector coincides with dwindling capital accumulation in 
the formal industries suggesting a relocation.  However, the exact route such mobile 
capital follows is difficult to unearth and can serve as a proxy on the aggregate.             
   Furthermore, data from NSSO also reveals that the own account enterprises or 
the self-employed units (OAEs) within the informal sector experienced positive 
growth in prices, output and participation.  These empirical features characterizing the 
informal sector are reflected in the short theoretical model.  In fact, the theory predicts 
that the wage of informal workers should increase and the informal industrial 
commodity expand in production if the formal import competing sector contracts due 
to withdrawal of trade protection.  The growth in value added and fixed assets in the 
NDMEs serve as approximations for these changes.   
Although generally, the informal sector activity pertains to non-traded items in 
the economy, from street vendors to domestic helps, in many countries they produce 
intermediate goods, processed exportable and import substitutes with subcontracts 
from the formal sector.  In such cases, the formal sector often adds the capital content 
(like, the brand name) only.  In many other cases, informal industries that produce 
garments, leather goods, small tools and machinery are known to export directly – 
often bypassing the formal regulations and procedures mainly through adjacent border 
trade.2 Apart from that, in all the developing countries, agriculture, poultry and 
fisheries are pre-dominantly outside the formal sphere and consumer non-durables 
                                                 
2
 Earlier, De Soto (1989) pointed out that a heavy burden of taxes, bribes and inflexible bureaucratic 
regulations in the formal sector drives many producers into the informal sector. 
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such as vegetables, fish and meat are procured from informal producers, processed 
and traded.  Analysing the impact of industrial and trade reform on these activities 
and on the workers employed therein should offer a wider view in favour of 
appropriate policy formulations.  It is to be noted that given the considerably large 
share of employment in these sectors even small positive gains in the real wage, can 
increase the economic attainments of millions in most developing and transition 
countries. 
As briefly referred to earlier, let us re-emphasize the fact that mobility and 
more specifically the degree of mobility of capital is one of the most instrumental 
factors behind tracing the connection between either prosperity or ruin in the formal 
sector to the implications it might have for the informal counterpart.  In this 
connection, it is imperative to discuss the precise mechanism that captures the issue of 
capital mobility, typically since there is neither a measure nor statistical evidence on 
how capital takes flight from dwindling industries and relocates into the prospering 
ones.  Marjit (2003) shows that even if a part of the informal sector is vertically linked 
with the formal sector and the formal sector contracts due to trade liberalization, 
informal wage can still increase.  In Marjit and Kar (2007) and Marjit, Kar and Beladi 
(2007) capital mobility also plays a major role in two sector formal-informal 
frameworks. Capital immobility reduces informal wage when informal employment 
expands, whereas allowing for freer capital mobility leads to exactly opposite 
outcomes.   
While there are other mechanisms that can generate such positive economic 
impact for the existing group, here the argument builds strongly on the observation 
that several developing countries have been experimenting with policies on trade 
reform for quite some time.  These include critical features like contraction of the 
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formal protected industries, either via import liberalization or through state initiatives 
in withdrawing support from loss-making public enterprises.  This implies that a large 
amount of capital and labour that were earlier part of these industries would now have 
to relocate to a more profitable venture.  In most of these countries, the vacuum left 
by the vanishing large scale public industries have been filled not by similar 
manufacturing units, but by predominantly service oriented smaller firms which face 
less stringent labour laws and industrial regulations.  And moreover, the new 
opportunities that have emerged in the so-called sunshine industries are incapable of 
accommodating the retrenched capital and labour, a larger share of which has hence 
been devoted to less formal employment.  There may be several explanations for this 
transition.  Normally, workers retrenched from typical import-competing public or 
private enterprises would not find it easy to get reemployment in formal service 
industries recruiting high-skilled professionals with advanced technical expertise that 
the older industries rarely employed.  We present a formal model below, which 
captures the exact mechanism whereby capital mobility affects the informal wage 
when the formal industrial sector crumbles under increased competition.  In particular, 
we argue that the mobility of capital between formal and informal sectors can provide 
a completely new and unconventional set of results that theoretical and empirical 
studies using purely partial equilibrium models fail to recognise.                    
 
4. Modelling Informal Sector 
Assume a two-sector small open economy.  X is produced in the formal 
manufacturing sector and Y is the informal manufacturing sector.  Both X and Y use 
labour and capital.  Wage in the formal segment is fixed through bargaining.  Initially, 
X is protected either through a tariff or by a state-subsidy, which artificially increases 
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the price of X.  Trade reform or withdrawal of subsidy implies a decline in the 
tariff/subsidy rate, denoted by t.  Workers, who do not find jobs in the formal sector 
flock in sector Y where they receive the market determined wage rate.  We call this 
the informal wage.  There is no open unemployment in this model.  People must find 
jobs to survive, and wage in the informal sector adjusts fully to accommodate workers 
moving into the sector.  Markets are competitive and technology exhibits CRS and 
diminishing marginal productivity. 
The model is similar in spirit to Agenor and Montiel (1996), Carruth and 
Oswald (1981), Marjit and Beladi (2002) and Marjit (2003).  Capital and land are 
fully employed. The symbols we use are given as follows: 
 
w : Formal unionized wage;   w : Informal (flexible) wage 
ir : Return to capital in sector i, i=X, Y;  X : Output of formal sector;  
Y : Output of informal sector  ),( YX PP : Exogenous commodity prices 
L :  Supply of Labour;   K : Total supply of capital 
iK : Supply of capital in sector i,;  :),( LYLX aa  Per unit labour use in X 
and Y. 
:),( KYKX aa  Per unit capital use in X and Y;   t : Import tariff  
„^‟ represents percentage changes for particular variables and symbols used bear the 
same implications as in Jones (1965). 
Competitive price equations that describe the system are given by, 
)1( tParaw XKXXLX     (1) 
YKYYLY Parwa      (2) 
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Commodity prices are given from the rest of the world.  Let us suppose Y is exported 
and X is imported.   
Full employment conditions imply:   
LYaXa LYLX      (3) 
KKK YX       (4) 
   XKX KXa       (5) 
 YKY KYa         (6) 
Let wˆ be so determined that,  
YX PPw ˆˆˆ   ,   1,0      (7) 
Finally, the capital mobility condition: 
0, 


 
Y
X
Y
X
r
r
K
K
      (8) 
Equation (8) suggests the following.  At any point of time K is allocated between X 
and Y.  But such allocation depends on return differential.  Hence there is imperfect 
mobility of capital.  If ,



Y
X
r
r increases, 
Y
X
K
K
 will also increases. 
Y
X
K
K
 describes the 
relative supply of capital in sector X.  The usual way to model this is to assume sector-
specific capital for X and Y without any mobility with 0 .  Perfect mobility will 
always imply XY rr  and there is no relevance for a separate sectoral supply function 
of capital.  Relative supply adjusts to demand in each sector and this is the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin structure.  We shall demonstrate that our comparative static depends 
on the curvature of 0 .   
 Given ),( YX PtP  , w , L, and K, we have w, YX rr , , X, Y, YX KK ,  to solve from 
(1)-(6) and (8).  The determination of general equilibrium proceeds as follows.  From 
 21 
(1) we can determine Xr .  Now using (4) and (8) we get (8) .   




Y
X
Y
Y
r
r
K
KK 
     (8) 
As Yr increases, given Xr and 0 , YK  must rise.  This defines the relationship MM 
in figure (1).  Now using (5), (6) and (3), 
LK
a
aKK
a
a
Y
KY
LY
Y
KX
LX  )(     (9) 
Since Xr is given by CRS, 
KX
LX
a
a
 is given.  Now as Yr  increases, from (2), 
w
rY
 must rise 
and 
KY
LY
a
a
must rise as well.  Hence in equation (9) the LHS unambiguously increases.  
To bring back the balance YK  must fall substantially.  As long as
KY
LY
a
a
> 
KX
LX
a
a
, LHS 
must decrease with a decline in YK .  Such an assumption implies that the informal 
sector is labour-intensive; an assumption by virtue of being realistic is kept all through 
the paper.  Therefore as Yr rises, YK must fall.  This defines FF in Figure (1).  Once  
( Yr , YK ) are determined from Figure (1), the rest of the variables can be determined 
easily. 
 The key comparative static exercise we are interested in is a decline in „t’.   
Figure (1) helps us to trace out the consequences of both.  A decline in t reduces Xr , 
given w and XP .  Given Yr  a drop in Xr increases YK , as 0 .  This will mean a 
rightward shift of MM to MM  .  
At the same time given Yr  and YK , a drop in Xr reduces
KX
LX
a
a
and therefore LHS 
in (9) declines.  The balance is restored through an increase in YK  at a given Yr .  FF 
shifts to the right as well.  The way Figure (2) is drawn suggests that Y must expand.  
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But Yr  may remain unchanged and can in fact go either way.  Note that if MM shifts 
quite a bit relative to FF, Yr  will decline and w will increase.  The mobility effect has 
to be significant for a positive effect on the informal wage.  A drop in
LY
LX
a
a
releases 
labour to Y sector, which implies that FF shifts up requiring more YK to accommodate 
displaced labour.  Additional capital that comes to Y because Xr is lower must 
outweigh the required amount needed to absorb displaced labour at a given Yr , hence 
at a given w to induce an increase in w.  With zero mobility MM is vertical and remain 
unchanged.  Hence, Yr must increase and w must decrease through a shift in FF.  With 
perfect mobility MM is horizontal at XY rr  and as Xr drops, MM shifts down.  
Notwithstanding the shift in FF, Yr  must adjust to the new level of Xr and w must 
increase.  Figure (3) describes the effects of such adjustments. 
 The above two cases explicitly demonstrate the partial and general 
equilibrium results that can be derived from this model.  In figure 5.2, the vertical line 
MM represents perfect immobility of capital between the formal and the informal 
segments.  Under the circumstances, formal job losses and crowding in of workers 
into the informal sector leads to wage cuts in the latter.  The situation undergoes a 
complete reversal if capital is perfectly mobile and is represented by a horizontal line 
MM (figures 2 and 3).  Retrenchments from the formal sector and additional job 
creation in the informal could even lead to a wage gain for the informal workers, thus 
establishing the general equilibrium implications of our model.    Finally, the precise 
condition for 0
dt
dw is given by: 



KX
LX
XX fKiffw 
,,0ˆ . (10) 3,4 
                                                 
3
 See Appendix A for detailed algebraic proof. 
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Figure 1. Determination of first equilibrium 
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Figure 2. Equilibrium interest rate under different patterns of capital mobility 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
4
 Condition (10) offers a directly testable hypothesis.  However, it requires matching data on product 
specific capital stock in both formal and informal sectors, and the return capital earns in each sector.    
Thus, we set aside this direct exercise for future work effort and use a proxy measure instead 
Yr  
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Figure 3 Considering perfect capital mobility 
 
 
5. Informal Wage and Poverty in India  
It is best to admit that relating informal wage and poverty to trade 
liberalization is a more difficult job empirically, than theoretically.  The empirical 
structure is highly dependent on the availability and reliability of data on informal 
sector.  This section draws on the wage implications of economic reform on the 
informal sector.  We argue that any measure of urban poverty is strongly dependent 
on the performance of the informal sector in the cities and our main hypothesis is the 
following.  If exogenous shocks, such as, a tariff reduction for the formal industrial 
units leads to a change in the wage of the informal workers, then one should expect a 
decline in the proportion of workers living in poverty using any standard measure of 
poverty.  It is well-known that large part of the urban poor in India works and lives 
under the so-called informal sector arrangements and that any improvement in the 
wages of the informal workers may significantly lower the incidence of poverty.  This 
would not be the case in the rural areas, because in comparison to the rural informal 
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sector a larger share of the poor is engaged in agriculture.  Thus, we test for the 
relationship between Urban Head Count Ratio (UHCR) and the urban informal wage 
(NDMEs). We conduct an OLS and an unbalanced panel regression for all the rounds 
of survey we have already discussed.  It should be noted that there are many other 
important variables that are potential candidates in the exercise, such as gender-based 
wages, specific occupational types and so on, which are excluded here mainly to 
provide an aggregative explanation of the main relations.  We relate the growth of 
informal wage in a period dominated by industrial trade liberalization and its effect on 
the percentage of people in the Below Poverty Line (BPL) category.  It is also to be 
noted that the informal sector data and the BPL data are not from the same samples 
and no common database that enumerates and reports both, exists.   
The exercise is carried out in two stages: first, we regress the current period‟s 
BPL percentage on previous periods Annual Informal Wage growth, where the results 
of the OLS suggests a negative relationship significant at 5% level (Table 1, 
Appendix B).  Second, we conduct the analysis as a panel of the states and union 
territories over four rounds of survey, and it reveals presence of random effects.  It 
nevertheless matches the OLS results closely.  However, as it can be seen from Table 
2 (Appendix B) the coefficient of IWPREV (real informal wage in the previous period) 
is still negative but now significant at 1% level.  To summarize, therefore, one may 
state that the effect of an improvement in the annual wage in the informal sector has 
negative and significant impact on the incidence of urban poverty across states and 
union territories in India. 
 
6. Informality and Corruption 
 
To construct the relation ship between informality and corruption consider a 
simple Ricardian type of production structure.  Labour is the only input of production 
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that is shared by the formal and the informal sector.  The formal–informal distinction 
is captured through the assumption that the wage level in the former is greater than 
that in the latter.  Such wage determination is beyond the control of the particular firm. 
Initially, we assume there is no difference in productivity of labour between segments. 
Therefore, it is quite likely that the entire production should shift to the informal 
sector. However this cannot be done since „informal‟ production is „illegal‟ due to it's 
violation of labour laws and hence calls for punitive measures from the state.  
For the producer, the probability of being apprehended while producing in the 
informal sector will depend upon the size of the informal sector. In our model, the 
probability of getting caught increases with the visibility of such sector, i.e., due to an 
increase in the employment level.  Clearly, when the product serves as an import 
competing good and is protected, the level of employment in each sector depends on 
the level of protection.  If the producer gets caught while producing in the in formal 
sector, he has to pay either a bribe or the punitive cost.  He will have to pay the bribe 
to the monitoring officer, who receives a salary otherwise independent of his 
monitoring capabilities. 
We now analyze the collusive game between the potentially bribing producer 
and the potentially corrupt monitoring officer. As the firm‟s profit level is a function 
of the tariff rate prevailing, and that all monitoring officers are corruptible, the 
punitive cost is assumed severe in that the producer is pushed to his reservation pay-
off.  Then the interesting part is to obtain the optimal level of bribing through a „Nash-
bargaining‟ approach. The net profit of the dishonest producer with tariff protection 
would be the profit at the given tariff rate less the bribe.  But if he does not pay a bribe, 
he is punished and the net profit falls to the reservation payoff level.  On the other 
hand if the monitoring officer takes a bribe his total income increases by the amount 
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of the bribe; otherwise remains at the level of his salary.   
The producer will try to rationally allocate the total production into two 
different sectors in order to maximize his total profit, under the condition that he 
might get caught with some probability if operating in the informal sector.  Using the 
Nash Bargaining solution regarding the optimal bribe paid, which is increasing in the 
level of the tariff protection, one can show that if the tariff protection falls, the total 
production and hence, the total labour requirements will fall. This is a conventional 
result. But what is more striking is that labour requirement in the informal sector will 
rise while the labour requirement in the formal sector will fall.   
Intuitively, as the tariff rate goes down, the equilibrium amount of bribe also 
goes down. Therefore, the effective marginal cost facing the informal segment also 
goes down which leads to a change in the composition of production in favour of the 
informal sector.  Declining tariff and the resultant fall in bribes indicates the 
beneficial effect of reformatory policy. However, this also increases the extent of 
extra-legal activity, i.e. the size of the informal output. Needless to say, this is the 
natural outcome when the labour market reform is kept on hold while trade reforms 
are prioritized. 
Apart from reforms in the external sector, it is also possible that internal 
economic readjustments also engender similar shifts in production organisation, with 
interesting twists as one encounters in the presence of large informal arrangements.  
For example, consider plausible consequences of introducing reforms in the capital 
market, i.e., lowering of interest rates. We introduce a notion of „working capital‟ in 
the basic model.  The notion of working capital has become quite significant in recent 
discussions of firm level investment with imperfect credit market.  Interested readers 
may have a look at Fazzari and Peterson (1993). The firm under consideration needs 
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to pay workers at the beginning of the period and then repays the principal and 
interest at the end of the production period. This is the standard idea of working 
capital or credit which affects the profitability of firms in a big way.  To prove our 
point we need not distinguish between formal and informal interest rates.  So we keep 
them the same at r.  Once again, maximizing the objective function of the producer 
where the choice is between labour allocation between formal and informal segments 
with probability of getting apprehended for such activities and the consequent 
punitive cost/bribe leads to the following outcome.  As the rate of interest goes down, 
total labour employment should increase.  However, the sectoral reallocations take an 
interesting turn.  We observe that a fall in the rate causes formal employment to 
expand and informal employment to shrink.  
In brief, therefore, if market interest rate falls given unchanged tariff 
protection, total labour requirement will rise along with an increase in the formal 
employment and a fall in informal employment.  As the per-worker investment is 
more in the formal sector as they have to be paid a higher wage, a fall in the interest 
rate lowers the relative cost of hiring formal workers and therefore the formal sector 
expands. Our earlier assumption suggests that the amount of bribe depends on the 
tariff rate because in case the entrepreneur has to close down his business, he will lose 
the protection induced incentive. 
In this case, however, as the interest rate goes down, the overall profit of the firm goes 
up and now the enforcement officials in this sector may ask for more bribes if the 
informal activities are to continue.  This discourages the use of informal workers 
further.  Nevertheless there is a possibility that albeit the size of the informal sector 
contracts, total bribe may actually go up.  Our main intention here is to focus on the 
size of the informal sector.  What we have shown so far is that a drop in tariff rate will 
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increase informal employment while a drop in interest rate reduces the same.  
Therefore, if one is looking at reforms driven by two different instruments, one should 
expect offsetting effects on the size of the informal segment. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper offers a different approach compared to prior attempts at 
quantifying and theorizing the activities of the informal sector in dual economy labour 
markets.  By linking the unorganised sector to the organized sector through capital 
mobility, we are able to estimate and theorize in more formal ways the effects of 
reform on the wage and employment status of workers in the informal sector.  The 
results, as we have discussed are quite revealing.  With the help of a rigorous general 
equilibrium model we establish that trade liberalization in the formal sector raises 
both employment and wages in the informal sector.  If capital is easily mobile 
between the two sectors, the implications are quite contrary to conventional wisdom.  
Even if capital is sticky, as we explored in other studies referred to earlier, downsizing 
of the capital intensive import competing sector may lead to increased output in the 
labour-intensive informal segment and raise informal wage.  The issue of capital 
mobility thus takes an important role in shaping the magnitude and directionality of 
informal wage subject to exogenous policy changes in the organized sectors of an 
economy.   
Furthermore, the role of labour productivity in both formal and informal 
sectors can also impart strong influences on the employment and wages in the 
informal sector.  Labour productivity improvement in the unskilled labour-intensive 
segments of the formal sector can improve informal wage even in the short run under 
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free mobility of capital, and with formalization of informal labour.  These issues along 
with relevant policy debates on concerns over governance, corruption and informality 
are expected to cover wider grounds through future research.    
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Appendix A 
 
Proof of condition (10) 
)1( tParaw XKXXLX       (A.1) 
YKYYLY Parwa        (A.2) 
0, 


 
Y
X
Y
X
r
r
K
K
 




Y
X
Y
Y
r
r
K
KK        (A.3) 
From (A.1), wPr LXXKXX ˆˆˆ    
 = )1(ˆ  LXXP             (A.4) 
Where, YX PPw ˆˆˆ   = XPˆ , since 0ˆ YP . 
From (A.2), 0ˆˆ  KYYLY rw  .  This implies, Y
LY
KY rw ˆˆ 
 .        (A.5) 
Now using equations (3) to (6),  
LYaXa LYLX  . 
Reformulating, LK
a
aKK
a
a
Y
KY
LY
Y
KX
LX  )(  
Again,  0ˆˆˆˆ  LYLYLXLXLYLX aaYX   
And  0)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆ  KYLYLYKXLXLXYLYXLX aaaaKK     (A.6) 
But, as YX KKK   
/ˆˆ YX KK  , where )/( YX KK . 
Substituting these information in (A.6),  
0)ˆˆ(ˆˆˆ1  YYLYXXLXYLYYLX rwrKK      (A.7) 
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Rearranging, and using (A.4), and YLY rrw ˆ)ˆˆ(   
0ˆ1ˆˆ)1( 

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YLY
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1ˆˆˆ)1(      (A.8) 
Now, taking „ln‟ on (A.3), 
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We define,   
 YX
YX
rr
rr
/
/
 , as the elasticity of capital mobility between sectors X 
and Y.  
Thus,    )1(ˆˆ.]11[ˆ  LXXYY PrK   
Therefore,   )1(ˆ]11[1ˆˆ  LXXYY PKr     (A.9) 
Rearranging equations (A.6) and (A.7), 
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







 )
1(
  (A.10) 



 
KX
LX
XXLXYY
LY
LY
Y PKr 

 1ˆˆˆ    (A.11) 
and 
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)1(ˆˆ)1(ˆ 

LXXYY PKr       (A.12) 
Using Cramer‟s rule to solve for Yrˆ . 
0
)1(
)1(1
)(






















 










LY
LY
YZ
LY
KY
TZ
LZ
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Y
D  
Therefore, )1(ˆ].)1([1ˆ 

LXX
XLX
Y PD
r    (A.13) 
Now, suppose 0ˆ XP , then 0ˆ Yr iff, 
  )1(XLX  
Finally, using (A.5) 
0ˆ w , iff, 
  )1(XLX     (A.14) 
or, 
 )1(  XLX  
or, 










 X
KX
LX
X
Y
Y
XLX
Y
X
Y
X
XLXXLX
K
K
K
K
K
K
K
K



1
1
 
Using (A.5.8), 0ˆ w , iff, 



KX
LX
XX fK 
  
The above derivation provides the proof of condition (10).   
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Appendix B 
 
 
Table 1.  Regressing current period‟s BPL percentage on previous year‟s 
Annual Growth of Informal wage 
 
Dependent variable: BPLPER 
Methodology: OLS 
Exp. Variables Coeff. t-ratio R2 AIC Log - Likelihood 
IWPREV (-) 0.236 (-) 2.57* 0.13 7.883 (-) 183.24 
CONSTANT 27.85 14.53* 
Note: BPLPER = BPL percentage 
 IWPREV = Previous year‟s growth rate of informal wage 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Unbalanced panel regression of current period‟s BPL percentage on 
previous year‟s Annual Growth of Informal wage 
 
Dependent variable: BPLPER 
Model: Random Effects Model 
Exp. Variables Coeff. t-ratio 
IWPREV (-) 0.229 (-) 5.17* 
CONSTANT 27.12 11.98* 
 
Diagnostics tests for the model: 
 
Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)      
Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman)     =     .01  
(1 df, prob value =  .940154)                    
(High (low) values of H favour FEM (REM).)         
             Sum of Squares          .6723   
             R-squared               .1248   
Note: BPLPER = BPL percentage 
 IWPREV = Previous year‟s growth rate of informal wage 
 
 
 
